Horizontal Mergers with Free Entry in Differentiated Oligopolies by Nisvan Erkal & Daniel Piccinin
  ISSN  0819-2642 







THE UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
 





Horizontal Mergers with Free Entry 










   
Department of Economics 
The University of Melbourne  
Melbourne      Victoria     3010 
Australia. 
 Horizontal Mergers with Free Entry
in Diﬀerentiated Oligopolies1
Nisvan Erkal2 and Daniel Piccinin3
First version: March 2006
This version: October 2006
1We are especially grateful to Simon Anderson for his comments and feedback. We also would like
to thank John Creedy, Carl Davidson, Robert Dixon, Russell Hillberry, Stephen King, Simon Lo-
ertscher, Anne van den Nouweland, and the participants of the International Industrial Organization
Conference (2006) for valuable comments, and Christian Roessler for his help in the numerical analy-
sis. We gratefully acknowledge the ﬁnancial support of the Faculty of Economics and Commerce at
the University of Melbourne.
2Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia. E-mail:
n.erkal@unimelb.edu.au.
3Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia. E-mail:
dpi@unimelb.edu.au.Abstract
Antitrust authorities view the possibility of entry as a key determinant of whether a pro-
posed merger will be harmful to society. This paper examines the eﬀects of horizontal
mergers in models of non-localized, diﬀerentiated Bertrand oligopoly that allow for free
entry. The analysis of the long run eﬀects of mergers in diﬀerentiated products markets
raises issues that are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those in the short run or in homogeneous
products markets due to the introduction of new varieties. Our analysis reveals that deter-
mining the properties of consumer preferences is crucial to the antitrust analysis of mergers
in diﬀerentiated products markets. Speciﬁcally, we show that if the demand system satisﬁes
the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property and if the number of ﬁrms is
treated as a continuous variable, mergers in diﬀerentiated products markets have no long
run eﬀect on consumer welfare. Moreover, in this case, marginal cost savings are to a large
extent irrelevant to the consumer welfare eﬀects of mergers. If the number of ﬁr m si st r e a t e d
as a discrete variable, ﬁxed or marginal cost savings are a necessary condition for mergers
to have zero or positive eﬀect on consumer welfare. Using the example of linear demand,
we show that if the demand system does not satisfy the IIA property, mergers in diﬀerenti-
ated products markets can harm consumer welfare in long run equilibrium. Moreover, the
amount of harm increases with consumers’ taste for variety.
JEL classiﬁcation: L13, L22, L41, K21
Keywords: Horizontal mergers; free entry; product diﬀerentiation; independence from
irrelevant alternatives; antitrust policy1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Antitrust authorities around the world regard the possibility of entry as an important
determinant of whether a proposed merger will be harmful to consumer and social welfare
and, hence, whether they will allow it to proceed. For instance, the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines issued by the antitrust authorities in the United States state that they consider
"whether entry would be timely, likely, and suﬃcient either to deter or to counteract the
competitive eﬀects of concern."1 Similar statements appear in the European Commission’s
horizontal merger guidelines and the Merger Guidelines of the Australian Consumer and
Competition Commission (ACCC).2
The reason that entry is considered important in merger analysis is that even if a merger
were to increase market power and prices in the industry, if it is possible subsequently for
other ﬁrms to enter the market, such entry may push the prices back down, possibly to their
pre-merger levels or below.3 This argument raises several important questions. First, can
mergers induce entry? Second, if a merger induces entry, will it still be privately proﬁtable?
Third, and most importantly, if entry is possible, what conclusions can we draw about the
implications of mergers for consumer welfare?
The goal of this paper is to analyze these questions in a theoretical model of non-localized
product diﬀerentiation and Bertrand competition. Imperfect substitutability is a common
and signiﬁcant feature of many markets in which mergers occur. Moreover, the long run
eﬀects of mergers in diﬀerentiated products markets are substantially more complex than
their eﬀects in the short run or in homogeneous products markets.
The short run eﬀects of mergers in diﬀerentiated products markets have been studied
1See Section 0.2 of the United States Merger Guidelines available at www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm.
2See paragraph 68 of the European Commission’s horizontal merger guidelines available at eu-
ropa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l26107.htm and p. 48 of the ACCC Merger Guidelines available at
www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/304397.
3Deneckere and Davidson (1985), Farrell and Shapiro (1990), and Werden and Froeb (1994) analyze the
impact of mergers in models without entry and conclude that mergers must be harmful to consumers unless
they result in productive eﬃciencies. Deneckere and Davidson (1985) consider a symmetrically diﬀerentiated
Bertrand market. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) assume a model of Cournot competition with homogeneous
products. Werden and Froeb (1994) consider a logit demand model with asymmetrically diﬀerentiated ﬁrms
and Bertrand competition.
1by Deneckere and Davidson (1985), who show that mergers without marginal cost savings
reduce consumer welfare. This is because they cause all prices to rise and to become
asymmetric since the merging ﬁrms charge higher prices than the outsider ﬁrms. The
asymmetry harms consumers because they have a taste for variety and, therefore, prefer to
spread their consumption evenly over the diﬀerentiated products.
The long run eﬀects of mergers in homogeneous products markets have been analyzed
by Spector (2003) and Davidson and Mukherjee (2006). Spector (2003) shows that without
technological synergies, mergers would be unproﬁtable if entry reduced prices to their pre-
merger level. Hence, any proﬁtable merger must harm consumer welfare.4 Davidson and
Mukherjee (2006) show that mergers generating marginal cost savings have no eﬀect on
consumer welfare. This is because the marginal cost savings allow the merger to remain
proﬁtable even though entry reduces prices to their pre-merger level.
In diﬀerentiated goods markets, the eﬀect of entry is not only to decrease prices, but
also to introduce additional variety which is of beneﬁt to consumers. Taste for variety plays
a central role in the analysis of the long run eﬀects of mergers because it aﬀects the amount
of entry that occurs, the market power that ﬁrms enjoy, and the disutility consumers get
from asymmetric consumption. Hence, although it is clear that mergers that do not result
in marginal cost reductions harm consumers without entry, this is by no means clear if the
merger is followed by entry.
We ﬁrst analyze the long run welfare eﬀects of mergers with demand systems that
satisfy the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property. Two commonly used
examples of demand systems that satisfy the IIA property are the logit and CES demand
systems. We ﬁnd that if the number of ﬁrms is treated as a continuous variable, there
are no long run eﬀects of mergers on consumer welfare.5 The beneﬁts of merger-induced
4Both Spector (2003) and Davidson and Mukherjee (2006) show that with symmetric entry costs and no
technological synergies, there can be no proﬁtable mergers in homogeneous products markets in the long
run. Hence, Spector (2003) assumes idiosyncratic entry costs to allow for proﬁtable mergers in a long run
equilibrium. Since Davidson and Mukherjee (2006) allow for marginal cost savings, they assume symmetric
entry costs.
5Since consumer welfare is unaﬀected by the merger and the non-merging ﬁr m se a r nz e r op r o ﬁts in a long
run equilibrium, the social welfare eﬀects of the merger depend only on its proﬁtability.
2entry exactly oﬀset the harm caused by the merging ﬁrms’ higher prices. Moreover, our
analysis reveals that as long as demand satisﬁes the IIA property, marginal cost savings are
to a large extent irrelevant to the consumer welfare eﬀects of mergers. We also show that
this welfare result can generalize to some cases with multi-product ﬁrms and to some cases
where ﬁrms initially have asymmetric market shares.
From the analysis of mergers where the number of ﬁrms is treated as a continuous
variable, it is possible to derive the implications for the more realistic case where the number
of ﬁrms is discrete. The two main results we have are the following. First, without ﬁxed
or marginal cost savings, a merger may still be proﬁtable because of the integer constraint.
However, since this implies insuﬃcient entry, the merger must harm consumer welfare.
Second, the impact on consumer welfare of a proﬁtable merger that generates either ﬁxed
or marginal cost savings depends solely on the operation of the integer constraint. This
result implies that from the perspective of an antitrust authority or a court, ﬁxed cost
savings alone can be an indicator that a merger may beneﬁt consumers. To our knowledge,
this point has not been made in the literature to date.
To explore the long run eﬀects of mergers in demand systems that do not satisfy the
IIA property, we next consider two commonly used linear demand systems. In the ﬁrst one,
due to Shubik (1980), we show that mergers without marginal cost savings must always
harm consumer welfare if the number of ﬁrms is treated as a continuous variable. We show,
however, that this is because in Shubik’s (1980) linear demand system consumers derive no
beneﬁt from new variety. We argue that this makes Shubik’s (1980) system inappropriate
for analyzing the long run eﬀects of mergers in diﬀerentiated products markets as it rules
out by assumption the variety eﬀect that distinguishes diﬀerentiated products markets from
homogeneous products markets.
We then analyze a linear demand system due to Ottaviano and Thisse (1999) that does
feature taste for variety. Using numerical simulations, we show that in this context mergers
without marginal cost savings can harm consumer welfare. Moreover, the magnitude of the
harm caused by the merger in Ottaviano and Thisse’s (1999) demand system depends on
3consumers’ taste for variety. This is in contrast with demand systems that satisfy the IIA
property, where consumers’ taste for variety has no impact on the eﬀect of mergers.
Two closely related papers that also consider the eﬀects of mergers in diﬀerentiated goods
markets with entry are Werden and Froeb (1998), and Cabral (2003). Werden and Froeb
(1998) consider the likelihood and eﬀects of merger-induced entry using a logit framework
with symmetric and asymmetric ﬁrms. They assume that there can be at most two merging
ﬁrms and one entrant. Using simulations, they show that both consumer and social welfare
may rise as a result of logit mergers with entry. However, they illustrate that most mergers
are unlikely to induce entry and that most mergers would be unproﬁtable if they did induce
entry. Cabral (2003) analyzes the eﬀect of mergers with entry using a Salop-type localized
competition model. He considers a market with two single-product incumbents and one
potential entrant. His results reveal that if the market is suﬃciently large, the merger
induces entry and causes consumer welfare to rise. However, if the merger results in marginal
cost savings, entry may be deterred and hence the merger may harm consumer welfare.
Our paper diﬀers from both of these papers in important ways. While Cabral (2003)
considers a localized competition model, we consider models of non-localized competition.6
Although Werden and Froeb (1998) also consider a model of non-localized competition,
our approach diﬀers in that we study the welfare eﬀects of mergers by solving for the
long run equilibrium with markets and mergers of any size. In comparison with Werden
and Froeb (1998), our results indicate that especially with mergers involving multi-product
ﬁrms and/or large mergers, one should not necessarily expect the integer constraint to result
in zero entry or insuﬃcient entry to counteract the negative eﬀects of the merger. Moreover,
our analysis applies generally to all demand systems that satisfy the IIA property. Finally,
by comparing mergers in demand systems that satisfy the IIA property with mergers in
demand systems that do not, we show that in diﬀerentiated products markets, determining
the properties of consumer preferences is a crucial ﬁrst step in the antitrust analysis of
mergers.
6As Cabral (2003) also notes, markets in real life are probably characterized by both localized and non-
localized competition.
4We proceed in the following way. After presenting the model in Section 2, we consider
in Section 3 the long run eﬀects of mergers in demand systems that satisfy the IIA property,
treating the number of ﬁrms ﬁrst as a continuous and then as a discrete variable. We then
turn our attention in Section 4 to demand systems that do not satisfy the IIA property, and
consider Shubik’s (1980) and Ottaviano and Thisse’s (1999) linear demand systems. Finally,
we conclude in Section 5 by summarizing the implications of our results and suggesting
avenues for future research.
2M o d e l
Assume there are initially N ﬁrms in a market featuring product diﬀerentiation and free
entry. The ﬁrms face identical marginal and ﬁxed costs, denoted by c and F respectively,
and they compete in prices. Firm i faces demand qi (N,p),w h e r ep is the vector of prices,
and earns proﬁts
πi =( pi − c)qi (N,p) − F, i =1 ,...,N.
We assume that the market is initially in a long run equilibrium. This implies that
there are potential entrants which initially ﬁnd it unproﬁtable to enter the market. In
the following analysis, to avoid integer problems, we ﬁrst treat the number of ﬁr m sa sa
continuous variable.7 Hence, in the long run equilibrium, all active ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts
before the merger. We then draw inferences about the equilibrium where the number of
ﬁrms is discrete based on the continuous N analysis.
The timing of events is as follows. In Stage 1, an exogenously determined group of M
of the N ﬁrms which are active in the pre-merger equilibrium merge. The merger creates
a multi-product ﬁrm. The merging ﬁrms continue to produce the same products, but they
make their pricing decisions jointly. In Stage 2, the potential entrants decide whether
to enter and the incumbent outsider ﬁrms decide whether to exit.8 Let E stand for the
number of entrants. The entrants produce goods symmetrically diﬀerentiated from the N
7This is standard in the literature. See Vives (2002) and Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
8Non-merging ﬁrms are referred to as outsider ﬁrms.
5incumbent ﬁrms’ goods.9 In Stage 3, all the ﬁrms in the market compete by choosing their
prices. Throughout the text, we use the subscripts m, o,a n dnm to refer to the merging
ﬁrms, the outsiders, and the case of no merger respectively.
From Deneckere and Davidson’s (1985) short run analysis, we know that the outsider
ﬁrms make higher proﬁts than the merging ﬁrms in equilibrium if the merger does not
generate cost savings. This is because the outsiders face a lower level of competition than
each of the merged ﬁrms. This implies that all mergers are unproﬁtable in the long run
without cost savings. With entry, the equilibrium proﬁts of the outsider ﬁrms are driven
down to zero. Since the merged ﬁrms earn less than the outsider ﬁrms, their proﬁts must
be less than zero. Hence, in the following analysis, we assume that the merger results in a
suﬃcient level of cost savings to make it proﬁtable to merge.10
To determine the long run impact of mergers on consumer and social welfare it is nec-
essary to be more speciﬁc about consumers’ preferences. We start the analysis in the next
section by considering demand systems which satisfy the IIA property.
3I I A a n d L o n g R u n E ﬀects of Mergers
We ﬁrst show that mergers in demand systems that satisfy the IIA property do not aﬀect
consumer welfare in the long run if N is treated as a continuous variable. We then analyze
the eﬀect of mergers on social welfare and in the case of discrete N in Sections 3.1 and 3.2
respectively.






where y is income and P is a function of the vector of prices p. This representation of the
indirect utility function assumes weak separability of prices from income, which is a less
9We rule out any type of strategic behavior by the incumbents to deter entry, such as limit pricing and
brand proliferation.
10Our analysis in Section 3 applies whether or not mergers generate marginal cost savings. If mergers do
not result in marginal cost savings, then we assume they generate a suﬃcient level of ﬁxed cost savings to
make them proﬁtable. In Section 4, we assume that mergers result in ﬁxed cost savings only.











∂pi < 0 for all i.
Moreover, since we are interested in the case of gross substitutes, we assume
Assumption 3
∂qi
∂pj > 0 for all i 6= j.







=0for all i,j 6= k.
Hence, in the context of continuous demand, the IIA property means that the ratio of
quantities demanded of any two goods is independent of the existence or price of a third




























where G(·) is a monotonically increasing function of one variable and fi (pi) is any function












11A further implication of this property that makes it an attractive simplifying assumption in merger
simulations is that the cross-price elasticities with respect to the price of a third good are the same for all
goods in the market. See Hausman (1975).
12See Theorem 1 on p. 389 of Goldman and Uzawa (1964) for the proof.
7which implies that consumer welfare remains unchanged if
P
i





fi (pi) is unchanged after the merger, we ﬁrst show that each outsider

























,w h e r eπ∗
i is the maximum
value of ﬁrm i’s proﬁts.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 1 establishes a connection between an outsider ﬁrm i’s proﬁts and consumer
welfare. The connection is that if the cumulative eﬀect of any price changes by the rival
ﬁrms and any entry that takes place as a result of the merger decreases an outsider ﬁrm i’s
proﬁt, it increases consumer welfare, and vice-versa. This result has immediate implications
for the welfare analysis of the long run eﬀects of mergers. These implications are summarized
in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 If the demand system satisﬁes Assumptions 1-4, then mergers do not have
any long run impact on consumer welfare.
Proof. For continuous N, the long run equilibrium condition implies that an outsider ﬁrm





fj (pj), which implies that
P
j6=i
fj (pj) is the same before and after
the merger. Hence, the best response of ﬁrm i must also be the same before and after
the merger. This implies that
P
j




fj (pj) and y only, consumer welfare is unchanged by the merger in a long run
equilibrium.
It is worth emphasizing the generality of the result stated in Proposition 1. First, even
if a merger results in marginal cost savings, Proposition 1 continues to apply as long as
these marginal cost savings do not induce all outsider ﬁrms to exit the market (i.e., as long
8as there are still some outsider ﬁrms which continue to make zero proﬁts).13 The result
depends on the monotonicity of outsider ﬁrms’ proﬁts in
P
j6=i
fj (pj). This monotonicity does
not rely on the actual values of the merging ﬁrms’ prices.
Second, Proposition 1 does not require the fj (pj) function to be symmetric among all
the ﬁrms in the market. Although the IIA property implies identical cross-price elasticities,
it does not imply that all varieties are equally attractive to the consumers and all ﬁrms
have equal market shares in equilibrium.14 However, the result does require at least one
outsider ﬁrm to earn zero proﬁts both before and after the merger. This would be satisﬁed
if the entrants and at least one of the outsider ﬁrms were symmetric.15
Third, Proposition 1 applies even if there are multi-product ﬁrms in the pre-merger
equilibrium (perhaps as a result of previous mergers), and even if the merger involves
multi-product ﬁrms. It is suﬃcient for the result stated in Proposition 1 to hold that there
are some single-product outsiders in the pre-merger equilibrium, and that the entrants are
single-product ﬁrms.
Fourth, the size of the merger plays no role in the consumer welfare result stated in
Proposition 1. Hence, although large mergers induce more entry, more entry is required
to oﬀset the negative eﬀects of large mergers. In demand systems which satisfy the IIA
property, these two eﬀects exactly oﬀset each other.
Finally, the consumer welfare result does not require quasilinearity. The existence of
income eﬀects does not change the analysis so long as the indirect utility function is separable
in income.16
The IIA property expressed in Assumption 4 is common to some demand systems that
13This result parallels the result of Davidson and Mukherjee (2006) who ﬁnd that mergers which result in
marginal cost savings in homogeneous products markets have no long run eﬀect on consumer welfare.
14For instance, consider the asymmetric logit model studied by Werden and Froeb (1994). They assume
that the conditional indirect utility of consumer i associated with the choice of product j is given by
Uij = αj − βpj + eij.
15This will not always be the case, but it may apply in many industries where there are one or two
"special" ﬁr m sf a c i n gc o m p e t i t i o nf r om other symmetrically diﬀerentiated ﬁrms.
16An important example of an IIA system with income eﬀects is the symmetric Almost Ideal Demand
System (AIDS). See Epstein and Rubinfeld (2001) for an argument for the use of a calibrated version of the
AIDS system in merger analysis.
9a r ef r e q u e n t l yu s e di nt h el i t e r a t u r e . 17 Consider, for example, the following logit demand


















where μ represents consumers’ taste for variety and V0 is the net beneﬁt a consumer receives














where again μ represents consumers’ taste for variety. Both of these demand systems satisfy
Assumptions 1-4. Hence, we can state the following corollary.
Corollary 1 In logit and CES demand systems if the number of ﬁrms, N,i sac o n t i n u o u s
variable, mergers have no long run eﬀect on consumer welfare.
We analyze the eﬀects of mergers with logit and CES demand systems in more detail in
Appendix B and C respectively. We show that although the consumer welfare results are
the same, they are driven by diﬀerent eﬀects. In the CES case, the beneﬁts of increased
variety are exactly oﬀset by a reduction in the total quantity consumed of the diﬀerentiated
products whereas in the logit case, the beneﬁts of increased variety are exactly oﬀset by a
reduction in the quantity consumed of the numeraire.
3.1 Social Welfare
Deﬁning social welfare as the sum of consumer welfare and proﬁts, we can immediately
see the implications of the above analysis for social welfare. Since there is no change in
consumer welfare with IIA preferences, the change in social welfare reduces to the change in
the proﬁt levels. Because the outsiders are subject to the zero proﬁt condition, this reduces
17Anderson et al., (1992) make this point about the logit demand system on p. 42 and about the CES
demand system on p. 86.
18See Ch. 7.4 in Anderson et al., (1992).
10further to the change in proﬁts for the merged ﬁrms. Hence, if the merger is proﬁtable,
social welfare rises, and if the merger is unproﬁtable, social welfare falls.
From Deneckere and Davidson (1985) we know that the merging ﬁr m se a r nl e s st h a n
the outsiders because of the free-rider eﬀect. Hence, without ﬁxed or marginal cost savings,
the merger is unproﬁtable, and if it were to occur anyway, social welfare would fall as a
result of the merger. If, however, the merger generates suﬃciently large cost savings, the
merger is proﬁtable and social welfare rises.
3.2 Discrete N
It is possible to draw conclusions from the continuous N analysis for the discrete N case.
The long run equilibrium condition for discrete N before the merger is that
πnm (N) > 0 >π nm (N +1 ).
After the merger, the condition is
πo (N + E) > 0 >π o (N + E +1 ).
In the case of discrete N,i ti sp o s s i b l et oh a v eap r o ﬁtable merger even without ﬁxed cost
savings because there may be insuﬃcient entry. However, any proﬁtable merger that does
not generate ﬁxed cost savings must harm consumers. This is because if the merger is
proﬁtable for the merging ﬁrms, it must also increase the proﬁts of the outsiders due the
free rider eﬀect. In other words, it must be the case that
πo (N + E) >π nm (N).
For this to happen there must be less entry than that described in the analysis above such
that in the post-merger long run equilibrium
po >p nm.
Since consumer surplus is unchanged in the continuous case, and since there is less entry
and higher prices in the discrete case, consumer welfare must fall.
11If, however, the merger results in ﬁxed or marginal cost savings, it is possible to have a
proﬁtable merger that beneﬁts consumers. This could occur through the operation of the
integer constraint. That is, suppose in the pre-merger equilibrium the integer constraint
operates to give outsider ﬁrms proﬁts that are higher than the proﬁts they earn in the
post-merger equilibrium. If this were the case, the amount of merger-induced entry would
be more than suﬃcient to counteract the negative eﬀects of the merger. Hence, consumer
welfare would rise as a result of the merger.
It is clear, then, that cost savings are a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for con-
sumer welfare to rise. This result has interesting implications for the antitrust treatment of
mergers. It is unreasonable to expect an antitrust authority to have suﬃcient knowledge to
predict the operation of the integer constraint. This means that, from the perspective of an
antitrust authority or a court, cost savings generated by a merger are an indication that the
merger may beneﬁt consumers. Importantly, however, from a consumer welfare perspective,
it is irrelevant whether these are ﬁxed or marginal cost savings. Hence, the analysis pro-
vides a potential justiﬁcation for favorable antitrust treatment of mergers generating ﬁxed
cost savings on the basis of consumer welfare analysis without resorting to social surplus
arguments. Fixed cost savings may be relevant to this assessment, even though they do not
directly aﬀect prices.19
This discrete N analysis has implications for Werden and Froeb’s (1998) conclusion
that mergers are unlikely to induce entry. Especially in the case of mergers between multi-
product ﬁrms or large mergers, the amount of entry that is induced in a continuous N long
run equilibrium is likely to be larger and, hence, the integer constraint will operate to allow
for a strictly positive amount of entry. In such cases, there is no strong ap r i o r ireason to
expect the integer constraint to operate in a way that results in insuﬃc i e n te n t r y .I tc o u l d
equally result in more than suﬃcient entry to counteract the negative eﬀects of the merger.
19This is especially important if antitrust treatment of mergers relies upon a consumer welfare analysis.
For instance, under s 50 of the Trade Practices Act (1975) in Australia, once a merger dispute reaches the
courts, it is not possible to justify the merger based on social welfare analysis.
124L o n g r u n e ﬀects of mergers with linear demand
Since diﬀerentiated products demand systems do not universally satisfy the IIA property, it
is important to consider the long run eﬀects of mergers outside the class of demand systems
that satisfy the IIA property. Hence, in this section we analyze the eﬀects of mergers using
linear demand systems. Since our goal is to show that mergers may harm consumer welfare
in demand systems that do not satisfy the IIA property, we consider mergers that do not
generate marginal cost savings.
Linear demand systems are important to consider for two reasons. First, they can
be understood as ﬁrst-order Taylor approximations to a larger class of non-linear demand
systems. If ﬁrms are boundedly rational, they may actually use such an approximation to
make their pricing decisions. If this is the case, using a linear demand system is not an
approximation of their behavior at all.20 Second, linear demand systems are frequently used
in the literature. The following analysis shows that mergers with linear demand systems can
lead to substantially diﬀerent welfare conclusions from those that satisfy the IIA property.21
One of the commonly used linear demand systems in diﬀerentiated products literature is
due to Shubik (1980). For example, Deneckere and Davidson (1985) use this linear demand
system in their analysis of short run eﬀects of mergers. In Appendix E, we show that in this
system all mergers without marginal cost savings harm consumers in the long run. This
is because consumers do not value variety in Shubik (1980). To see this, it is necessary to
provide a precise deﬁnition of taste for variety. We follow Benassy’s (1996) deﬁnition of
taste for variety because of its intuitive appeal and its generality. In this deﬁnition, taste





where U (q,N) is the utility that a consumer derives from consuming q units of N symmet-
rically diﬀerentiated varieties. Thus, the numerator is the utility a consumer derives from
20See Ottaviano and Thisse (1999) for a discussion of this point.
21The results based on the IIA property derived above may also change if it is assumed, as in Section 4.4
of Dixit and Stiglitz (1975) and Benassy (1996), that variety has a public good characteristic. We show this
in Appendix D.
13consuming a certain total quantity of the diﬀerentiated products, divided symmetrically
amongst the N varieties in the market. The denominator represents the utility the con-
sumer derives from consuming the same total quantity of a single variety. Hence, if T =1 ,
consumers have no taste for variety.
Applying this deﬁnition to Shubik’s (1980) demand system, we get T =1 . This means
that although consumers have what might be called a love of symmetry, they have no taste
for variety. That is, they prefer to spread consumption over all available varieties, but they
derive no additional utility from an increase in the number of available varieties. At sym-
metric prices, the consumer’s utility is similar to the utility of a consumer in a homogeneous
products market in that it does not depend on the number of varieties consumed. However,
at asymmetric prices, consumer behavior is similar to that of a consumer in a diﬀerentiated
products market in that they choose to consume positive quantities of the diﬀerent varieties.
To see the implications of the fact that T =1in this demand system for the eﬀect
of variety on welfare, we show in Appendix E that at symmetric prices, utility depends on
total quantity only and total quantity depends on the symmetric price level only. Therefore,
introducing a new variety at a price above the incumbents’ symmetric price level harms
consumer welfare. In this sense, variety is a public bad in Shubik’s (1980) demand system.22
Consumers’ attitudes towards variety in Shubik’s (1980) demand system play a central
role in the consumer welfare-reducing eﬀects of mergers. Without a love of symmetry we
would have a model with homogeneous products, in which case a merger would have no
eﬀect on prices and hence would not induce entry. However, because consumers have no
corresponding love of variety, they do not beneﬁt from the new varieties except insofar as
they mitigate the price increasing eﬀects of the merger. Since entry fails to completely
reverse these price increases, consumers are harmed by the merger.
What distinguishes the welfare analysis of mergers in diﬀerentiated products markets
from homogeneous products markets is the beneﬁtt h a tnew variety brings to consumers.
22Two related problems that make Shubik (1980) undesirable to use in a model with entry are its violation
of WARP with respect to variety and the discontinuity of the indirect utility function. We elaborate on these
in Appendix F.
14Although Shubik’s (1980) demand system features product diﬀerentiation, it lacks this
important property. Without taste for variety, the only beneﬁtt h a te n t r yc a nb r i n gi s
more intense price competition. Hence, Shubik’s (1980) demand system is not suﬃcient
to capture the welfare-improving eﬀects of merger-induced entry in diﬀerentiated products
markets.
4.1 Ottaviano and Thisse’s (1999) linear demand system
In this section, we consider the consumer welfare eﬀects of mergers in a linear demand
system due to Ottaviano and Thisse (1999), where consumers do display a taste for variety.
We show that this linear demand system still produces consumer welfare results which diﬀer
substantially from the IIA case.
Suppose the representative consumer’s preferences can be described by the following
utility function.
















qiqj + q0,( 3 )
where α>0 and β>γ>0. qi stands for the quantity of variety i and q0 stands for the
quantity of the numeraire good. α is a measure of the size of the market for the diﬀerentiated
goods. The absolute value of the fourth term in (3) increases as consumption becomes more
symmetric. Hence, as γ increases, the representative consumer would have a preference
for concentrating consumption. On the other hand, the absolute value of the third term
in (3) increases as consumption becomes more concentrated. Hence, as β increases, the
representative consumer would have a preference for smoothing consumption.
Applying Benassy’s (1996) deﬁnition of taste for variety in the context of this quadratic
utility function allows us to identify a condition on the parameters γ and β. Suppose Q is
the total quantity consumed. If the consumer consumes only a single variety, (3) becomes
U = K + αQ −
β
2
Q2 − q0.( 4 )
If the consumer consumes N varieties in quantity q each such that Q = Nq, (3) becomes






N (N − 1)q2 − q0.( 5 )
15The consumer has taste for variety whenever (5) dominates (4). Substituting for Q = Nq
in (4) and simplifying yields
β>γ .
Hence, as γ gets smaller for a given value of β,o ra sβ gets larger for a given value of γ,
the preference for variety gets stronger.
This quadratic utility function generates demand functions of the form
qi =
1
β + γ (N − 1)
⎡
⎣α −









⎦,i ∈ [1,N].( 6 )
Since we are considering single-product ﬁrms and each ﬁrm produces a diﬀerent variety, N
represents both the number of varieties and the number of ﬁrms in the market. Note that
when γ =0 , the demand for good i becomes independent of the prices of the other goods
in the market. Moreover, as (β − γ) increases, qi becomes less sensitive to changes in own
price and the prices of other goods. Hence, as taste for variety increases, ﬁrm i’s market
power increases.
Assuming c =0without loss of generality, each ﬁrm i maximizes
πi = pi · qi (pi) (7)
with respect to pi taking the prices charged by the other ﬁr m sa sg i v e n .S i n c ea l lﬁrms are




γ (N − 3) + 2β
¸
.( 8 )





β + γ (N − 2)
(β + γ (N − 1))
¸
.
Substituting for these equilibrium price and quantity levels in (7) yield
πnm = α2 (β − γ)(β + γ (N − 2))
(γ (N − 3) + 2β)
2 (β + γ (N − 1))
− F (9)
16as the equilibrium proﬁt level for each ﬁrm. Note that pnm → 0 and πnm →− F as β → γ.
That is, when the representative consumer has no taste for variety, competition drives prices
and proﬁts down to zero. Hence, unlike in the case of Shubik (1980), without a taste for
variety, we have a model of homogeneous goods.









γ (N + E + M − 3) + 2β
¸
Mpm









2(β + γ (N + E − M − 1))
¸
(N + E − M)po
as the best response function of the merging ﬁrms. Solving these best response functions
simultaneously gives us the equilibrium prices. Substituting the equilibrium prices into the






β + γ (N + E − 2)






β + γ (N + E − M − 1)
(β + γ (N + E − 1))
¸
.
To compare the prices charged by the outsiders before and after the merger, we use the






β + γ (N + E − 2)







β + γ (N − 2)
(β + γ (N − 1))
¸







(β + γ (N − 2))(β + γ (N + E − 1))
(β + γ (N − 1))(β + γ (N + E − 2))
.
It is straightforward to see that this ratio is < 1 and hence po <p nm.T h i si si nc o n t r a s t
with the demand systems that satisfy the IIA property, where, as we show in the proof of
Proposition 1, po = pnm. In this linear demand system, the outsider ﬁrms charge a price
below the pre-merger equilibrium price because although they face less intense competition
17from the merging ﬁrms, they face tougher competition overall due to the new entrants.
Using the long run equilibrium condition, this implies qo >q nm.
Having solved for ﬁrm behavior, we would like to determine the eﬀect of the merger on
consumers. We begin by showing that in this demand system, the total quantity consumed
of the diﬀerentiated products increases as a result of the merger.23 This result may seem
surprising since one of the primary antitrust concerns with mergers is that they reduce total
output. In this case, total output rises because although entry results in business stealing,
some of the demand for the entrants’ products is "stolen" away from the numeraire. Hence,
entry expands the market for the diﬀerentiated products.
Unfortunately, due to the intractability of the equations, we have not been able to show
analytically the net eﬀect of a merger on consumer welfare in this demand system. However,
we have undertaken some numerical analysis which illustrates that mergers can harm both
consumer and social welfare in the long run. Although this is not a general proof, we have
not found any combination of parameter values for which consumer and social welfare is
not harmed.
Since mergers are of most concern to antitrust authorities when they occur in relatively
concentrated industries, consider the following parameter values which generate N =8 .37:
α =7 0 , β =2 0 , γ =5 ,a n dF =1 5 . Table 1 reports the consumer welfare eﬀects of mergers
of varying sizes. Column 3 of Table 1 shows the pre-merger consumer welfare level, which
is also equal to the pre-merger social welfare level because ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts. As can
be seen from the table, the change in consumer welfare is always negative and deteriorates
as the size of the merger increases.24
23See Appendix G for the proof. In contrast, total quantity consumed of the diﬀerentiated products
remains unchanged in the logit demand system and decreases in the CES and Shubik’s (1980) linear demand
systems.
24The change in social welfare depends on the amount of ﬁxed cost savings that the merger generates. For
suﬃciently large ﬁxed cost savings the merger may improve social welfare.
18Table1: Welfare eﬀects of mergers in a linear demand system
ME C W nm ∆CW
2.07 0.11 216.93 −0.72
4.06 0.66 216.93 −3.68
6.05 1.61 216.93 −7.92
8.03 2.89 216.93 −12.37
Table 2 illustrates the impact of a change in β on the consumer welfare eﬀects of mergers
of a given size. For ﬁxed values of γ, β captures consumers’ taste for variety. The parameter
values are the same as before except that we set M =0 .6N. Again, the change in consumer
welfare is always negative. Interestingly, it is non-monotonic in β. To see why, note that β
has two kinds of eﬀect on ﬁrms’ proﬁts. The ﬁrst eﬀect is that, as can be seen from (3), a
higher β corresponds to a higher taste for variety and, hence, higher market power for the
ﬁrms. The second eﬀect is that an increase in β increases the relative attractiveness of the
numeraire compared with the diﬀerentiated products. The numerical analysis suggests that
for low values of β,t h eﬁrst eﬀect dominates. Hence, an increase in β results in increases in
N and E. Higher market power also reduces the consumer welfare level in the pre-merger
equilibrium. The net result is that an increase in β exacerbates the negative eﬀects of the
merger.
For high values of β, the second eﬀect of β on ﬁrm proﬁts dominates. This negative
eﬀect causes both N and E to decrease with β. The results indicate that for high values of
β, consumer welfare in the pre-merger equilibrium still decreases with β, but the negative
consumer welfare eﬀects of the merger diminish with β.
Table 2: Impact of taste for variety in a linear demand system
βN E C W nm ∆CW
6.14 4.23 0.57 393.29 −2.30
10.30 6.64 0.96 314.97 −4.56
20.91 8.42 1.06 210.31 −6.66
30.45 8.36 0.90 153.44 −5.04
40 7.64 0.67 111.62 −3.91
195C o n c l u s i o n
Antitrust authorities regard the possibility of entry as an important determinant of whether
a proposed merger will be harmful to consumer and social welfare. We have analyzed
whether entry can mitigate the negative eﬀects of mergers in non-localized, diﬀerentiated
products markets with Bertrand competition.
We show that if the demand system satisﬁes the IIA property and the number of ﬁrms
is treated as a continuous variable, mergers in diﬀerentiated products markets have no long
run eﬀect on consumer welfare regardless of whether the merger generates marginal cost
savings. If the number of ﬁrms is treated as a discrete variable, then mergers can harm
or improve consumer welfare in the long run depending on whether there is insuﬃcient or
more than suﬃcient merger-induced entry due to the operation of the integer constraint.
However, we show that if a proﬁtable merger does not generate any cost savings, it must
harm consumer welfare. Hence, cost savings, either ﬁxed or marginal, are a positive indicator
of the consumer welfare eﬀects of mergers.
If the demand system does not satisfy the IIA property, mergers in diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts markets can harm consumer welfare in a long run equilibrium. Hence, our analysis
reveals that unlike in the case of homogeneous products markets, determining the proper-
ties of consumer preferences is crucial to the antitrust analysis of mergers in diﬀerentiated
products markets. The choice of the demand system to be used in the antitrust analysis
can aﬀect not only the predicted quantitative eﬀects of a merger, but also the qualitative
eﬀects. This implies care should be taken when choosing a demand system to simulate the
long run eﬀects of mergers because the model selection can essentially pre-determine the
results.
Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that when analyzing the long run eﬀects of mergers
in diﬀerentiated products markets, it is important to start with a demand system where
consumers beneﬁt from new variety. This is because in diﬀerentiated goods markets, the
eﬀect of entry is not only to decrease prices, but also to introduce additional variety which
is of beneﬁt to consumers. We have argued that this makes Shubik’s (1980) system inap-
20propriate for analyzing the long run eﬀects of mergers in diﬀerentiated products markets
since it rules out by assumption the variety eﬀect that distinguishes diﬀerentiated products
markets from homogeneous products markets.
In conclusion, our analysis reveals that the long run eﬀects of mergers in diﬀerentiated
products markets are substantially more complex than their eﬀects in the short run or
in homogeneous products markets. For future research, we suggest that more systematic
research is required into the modelling of taste for variety. Since consumer attitudes towards
variety can have profound eﬀects on the analysis of important policy questions, it would be
valuable to develop a theory of taste for variety that can explain the relationship between
the structure of the various functional representations of consumer preferences and primitive
consumer preferences in relation to the addition of new varieties. Once this relationship is
better understood, researchers and analysts will be better equipped to choose and defend
their choices of demand systems.
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AP r o o f o f L e m m a 1
Each outsider ﬁrm i solves the following problem.
max
pi


















































! ,( 1 )
where p∗
i is the solution to ﬁrm i’s maximization problem taking the prices of all the other
ﬁr m sa sg i v e n .H e n c e ,π∗
i is monotonic in
P
j6=i













































From Assumption 3, we know that this expression is > 0. Hence, qi is monotonic in
P
k6=i
fk (pk) if fj (pj) is monotonic in pj.






















for all values of pi,p j.
Since fi (pi) and fj (pj) share no common arguments and since their slopes have the same
sign as each other regardless of the values of pi and pj, they must be monotonic functions.
Using (2) we can conclude that qi changes monotonically with
P
j6=i
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BL o g i t D e m a n d
The speciﬁc logit demand framework we consider is that with an outside alternative, as set
out in Anderson et al., (1992), Ch. 7.4.25 This is a discrete choice model where heteroge-
neous consumers choose to consume a single unit of output from one of a number of ﬁrms
each producing a symmetrically diﬀerentiated product. Indirect utility for an individual
consuming good i, conditional on that individual choosing to consume good i,i s
e Vi = y − pi + εi,
where y stands for the income level and εi represents an idiosyncratic match value between
the consumer and good i.T h eεi’s are identically, independently, and double exponentially
distributed. Conditional indirect utility for the numeraire is
e V0 = y + V0 + ε0..
Given εi and the prices, individuals choose to consume exactly one unit of the good
that yields the highest indirect utility. Normalizing the number of consumers to unity, the
expected demand function of ﬁrm i is the probability that a consumer would choose to



















where μ is proportional to the variance of εi. Hence, μ is a measure of consumer hetero-
geneity, or from a representative consumer perspective, taste for variety.
25Anderson et al., (1992) show that both the logit and CES systems can be derived as representative
consumer, random utility, and spatial models. We analyze the logit system in a random utility framework
and the CES system in a representative consumer framework, as is standard in the literature.




where qi i sg i v e ni n( 3 ) .T h eﬁrst order condition gives us26




In the long run equilibrium,
(pi − c)qi = F.
Substituting this into the expression in (4) shows that the long run pre-merger price is
pnm = c + μ + F.( 5 )
Since the ﬁrst order condition is a function of the ﬁrm’s own price and quantity only, the
operation of the long run equilibrium condition makes the consideration of the strategic
interactions between the ﬁrms irrelevant to the determination of the long run equilibrium
price. In this sense, the long run equilibrium with a logit demand system has characteristics
of a monopolistically competitive market, despite the fact that the ﬁr m sd ot a k ei n t oa c c o u n t
the impact of their prices on the market price index, as shown in the denominator of (3).
After the merger, the ﬁrst order condition for the outsiders’ maximization problem is
identical to that given in (4) because it is a function of own price and quantity only. This
implies that in the post-merger long run equilibrium po = pnm for all N+E−M outsiders. If
the outsiders charge the same prices and earn the same proﬁts before and after the merger,
they must produce the same quantities too. Due to joint proﬁt maximization, the merging
ﬁrms charge a higher price. Hence, we get pm >p o = pnm.
To analyze the impact of the merger on consumer welfare, we can apply Roy’s Identity
















26As shown by Anderson et al., (1992) on p. 222, the second order condition holds wherever the ﬁrst order
condition does, implying that the proﬁt function is strictly quasiconcave.
27Evaluating this expression at the pre-merger and post-merger long run equilibria gives us
























































































Substituting this expression in (6) gives us the result that the merger has no impact on
consumer welfare.
We can decompose the eﬀect of the merger in the following way. Consider ﬁrst what
happens to total quantity. Change in total quantity is given by
∆Q =( N + E − M)qo + Mqm − Nqnm.
































Hence, after the merger, with no change in total quantity, the same amount of total con-
sumption is distributed over more goods. Since pm >p o = pnm, this implies that total
expenditure increases. However, although consumption is asymmetric after the merger in
that qm <q o = qnm, when pre-merger and post-merger consumption of all N + E goods
is considered, consumption is more symmetric post-merger. Since consumers have hetero-
geneous tastes, they beneﬁt from the increased variety available to them because they are
able to ﬁnd a better match.27 The consumer welfare result above implies that this beneﬁt
27See Anderson et al., (1992), Ch. 7.4 for a technical discussion.
28from reduced asymmetry is exactly oﬀset by the increase in total expenditure.
CC E S D e m a n d
In this section, we consider a quasilinear utility function with a CES subutility. CES demand
functions are closely related to logit demand functions. In fact, as Anderson et al., (2001)
show, the two demand systems can be modeled as special cases of a more general demand
system. We show in this section that although both the logit and CES demand systems
yield the same consumer welfare result, the reasons behind the result in the two models are
diﬀerent.
Direct utility for the representative consumer in this framework is







+ qo,( 9 )
where μ again represents the taste for variety. That is, as μ increases, consumers prefer
spreading their consumption over the available varieties in the market.




piqi + qo =1
where, without loss of generality, income is set equal to 1. This optimization problem leads












.( 1 0 )
Firm i maximizes (pi − c)qi. The pre-merger ﬁrst order condition is
1
(μ +1 )













.( 1 1 )
29Once again, after the merger, the ﬁrst order condition for the outsiders is identical to
their ﬁrst order condition before the merger. Hence, in the post-merger long run equilibrium,
po = pnm.
To get an expression for the consumer welfare function, we can substitute the demand
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m .( 1 3 )
Substituting in (12) gives us the result. Hence, the long run change in consumer welfare is
as in the logit case.28
However, in the CES case, the decomposition of the eﬀect of the merger on consumer
welfare is diﬀerent from the logit case. To see this, note that the change in total quantity
c a nb ee x p r e s s e da s
∆Q =( N + E − M)qo + Mqm − Nqnm.










.( 1 4 )
28With a similar analysis, Anderson et al., (1997) show that the privatization of a public social surplus












This expression < 0 since pnm <p m.
Using (10) we can show that total expenditure on the diﬀerentiated products, both

























Hence, in the CES case, consumption of the diﬀerentiated goods falls and consumption
of the numeraire remains unchanged.29 This implies that in the CES case the beneﬁts
of increased variety is exactly oﬀset by the reduction in the total quantity consumed of
the diﬀerentiated products, whereas in the logit system the beneﬁts of increased variety is
exactly oﬀset by the reduction in the quantity of the numeraire.
D Variety as a public good
The results based on the IIA property derived above may change if it is assumed, as in
Section 4.4 of Dixit and Stiglitz (1975) and Benassy (1996), that variety has a public good
characteristic. Suppose indirect utility depends directly on the number of varieties available,
not just indirectly through the level of consumption of those varieties. The simplest way to
model this would be to incorporate it into a CES framework, which yields








where φ>0. As Dixit and Stiglitz (1975) argue, this may make sense if variety is valuable to
accommodate potential future changes in consumer tastes or if individuals prefer to consume
goods that are diﬀerent to those consumed by other individuals in order to maintain a sense
of individuality.
Because of the way Nφ enters the utility function, it does not aﬀect optimal consumer
or ﬁrm behavior. Hence, it has a public good characteristic. This implies that all of the
29Total expenditure is always constant in CES demand systems.
31market outcomes we derived in the CES analysis above still hold. Consumer welfare is given
by








Because the market outcomes are the same as in the CES case, change in consumer welfare
reduces to
(N + E)
φ − Nφ > 0.
Hence, the public good characteristic of variety makes mergers desirable for consumers in
the long run because the entry they induce provides additional value to consumers beyond
the beneﬁts from consuming new varieties.
E Shubik’s (1980) linear demand system





















+ q0.( 1 5 )
Maximizing this utility function subject to the consumer’s budget constraint yields the

















Before the merger, ﬁrm i maximizes πi =( pi − c)qi.A s s u m i n g c =0without loss of





30In Deneckere and Davidson’s (1985) version of this system, the demand function does not have the 1/N
term before the brackets. This makes no diﬀerence in their analysis because they do not consider entry.
Davidson and Mukherjee (2006) use this same system without the 1/N term and do consider entry. Hence,
their system generates qualitatively diﬀerent long run equilibrium behavior from the formulation considered
here.
32as the pre-merger equilibrium price. We can then express the equilibrium quantity in terms
of the equilibrium price in the following way.
qnm = pnm
µ
N + γ (N − 1)
N2
¶
.( 1 7 )
After the merger, the outsider and merging ﬁrms set
po = α
Ã
2N + γ (2N − M)
4N +2 γ (3N − M − 1) + γ2 ¡N−M
N
¢





2N + γ (2N − 1)
4N +2 γ (3N − M − 1) + γ2 ¡N−M
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(2N + M − 2)
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In the long run, pnmqnm = poqo. Substituting for qnm and qo from (17) and (18)







N2 (N + E + γ (N + E − 1))




It is straightforward to show that this expression is < 1. Hence, in a long run equilibrium,
po >p nm. Since joint proﬁt maximization implies pm >p o, we can conclude that
pm >p o >p nm.
In other words, all prices rise in the long run as a result of the merger. This implies that
entry drives proﬁts down to their original level more quickly than it drives prices down to
33their original level.32
To analyze the long run eﬀect of the merger on consumer welfare, consider the consumer’s





2 + q0. (19)
This depends only on the total quantity consumed of the diﬀerentiated products and not
on the number of varieties that total quantity is spread over. The long run eﬀect of the
merger on consumer welfare can be analyzed in three steps. First, holding prices constant
at pnm, consider an increase in the number of ﬁrms to N+E. This causes no change in total
quantity since, as can be seen from (16), total quantity at a symmetric equilibrium is equal
to α−p.33 Such an increase in the number of varieties causes no change in consumer welfare
since neither the prices nor total quantity has changed. Second, consider an increase in the
prices of all of the N +E varieties to po. Clearly, this step harms consumer welfare. Finally,
increase the prices of the merging ﬁrms to pm. This step must also decrease consumer
welfare. Hence, both total quantity and consumer welfare fall following a merger with
entry.
F Entry in Shubik’s (1980) demand system
To see that Shubik’s (1980) demand system violates the principles underpinning the Weak
Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP), let q0 be the bundle of goods demanded by the
consumer facing the price vector p0 =( p1,...,p N) where p1 = p2 = ... = pN = p.N o wl e t
q1 be the bundle demanded by the consumer facing the price vector p1 =( p1,...,p N,p zero)
where the prices of goods 1 to N are the same as in p0 and pzero is the price at which the
consumer demands exactly zero from the N +1 th ﬁrm. Note that q1 is aﬀordable at the
original price vector, p0, because it contains zero units of the N +1th good, and the prices
32This point can be most immediately seen by comparing this demand system with the demand system
used in Davidson and Mukherjee (2006). The prices are identical in the two systems for any N,b u tt h e
proﬁt level is lower and decreases more rapidly with N in this demand system.
33Recall that, holding prices constant, total quantity in the CES system is also invariant to the number
of ﬁrms in a symmetric equilibrium.
34of the other N goods are unchanged. Also, q0 is aﬀordable at the new price vector, p1,f o r
t h es a m er e a s o n .
The principles behind WARP then require these two bundles to be the same. However,






















N (1 + γ)+1
¸
.( 2 0 )
Solving for the pN+1 value such that q0
i = q1
i gives
pN+1 =( N +1 )
µ




which is clearly not the same as pzero given in (20). This means that despite the fact that
q1 is aﬀordable at p0 and q0 is aﬀordable at p1, they are not the same bundle. In other
words, q0 is revealed preferred to q1 and vice-versa. This result implies that in this demand
system, the mere introduction of a new variety, even one that consumers choose not to
consume due to its high price, alters consumers’ preferences for the incumbent varieties.
This would not be the case in a demand system that satisﬁes the principles behind WARP.
To see how this violation of the principles behind WARP relates to consumers’ lack of
taste for variety, note that in any model of product diﬀerentiation where the principles of
WARP are satisﬁed, consumer welfare increases with the introduction of a new variety at
a price at which consumers choose to consume a positive amount of that variety.34 This
implies that consumers’ preferences satisfy Benassy’s deﬁnition of taste for variety. Hence,
34This is true unless the direct utility function depends on N directly. For example, consider the utility
function speciﬁed in Appendix D. If variety were modeled as a public bad in this demand system, it would
continue to satisfy WARP, but it would not necessarily feature a taste for variety.
35a demand system where consumers’ preferences do not satisfy Benassy’s deﬁnition of taste
for variety must necessarily violate WARP.
A related problem with this demand system is that the indirect utility function is dis-
continuous at pzero. To see this, let us ﬁx the prices of the incumbent varieties at the
symmetric price p and consider how indirect utility changes with pN+1.A tpN+1 = p,t h e
indirect utility level with N +1goods is equal to the indirect utility level with N goods.
This is because, as established in Appendix E, when prices are symmetric and held constant
at p, total quantity does not vary with the number of ﬁrms and direct utility depends on
total quantity only. For p<p N+1 <p zero, the indirect utility function is strictly decreasing
in pN+1. This implies that if a ﬁrm enters the market with a price higher than the symmet-
ric price p, it harms consumer welfare despite the fact that consumers choose to consume a
positive amount of the new variety. This is connected to consumers’ lack of taste for variety.
At pN+1 = pzero, there is a jump in the indirect utility function since for pN+1 >p zero the
N +1 th variety is no longer in the market and the indirect utility function has the same
v a l u ea si td o e sw h e npN+1 = p.35
GM e r g e r ’ s e ﬀect on total quantity in Ottaviano and Thisse’s
(1999) demand system
We would like to show that
(N + E − M)qo + Mqm − Nqnm > 0.( 2 1 )
Since this expression becomes intractable after substituting for the expressions of qo, qm
and qnm, we proceed in the following way.
Step 1:W eﬁrst show that the quantity demanded of an outsider ﬁrm’s variety at price
pnm is the same whether there are N ﬁrms charging pnm,o rN ﬁrms charging pnm and a
further E ﬁrms charging pzero,w h e r epzero is the price at which consumers demand exactly
35Removing the 1/N factor, as in Davidson and Mukherjee (2006) does not solve either one of these
problems.
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.
The ﬁrst equation gives the quantity demanded for the variety produced by an outsider ﬁrm
i if it has N − 1 rivals each charging pnm. Clearly, b qi (pnm)=qnm. The second equation
gives the quantity demanded for the variety produced by an outsider ﬁrm i if it has N − 1
rivals each charging pnm and a further E rivals charging pzero. The third equation gives
the quantity demanded for the variety produced by an entrant ﬁrm j if it has N rivals
each charging pnm and a further E − 1 rivals charging pzero. It is straightforward to show
that the value of pzero that makes b qi (pnm)=qi (pnm)=qnm i st h es a m ev a l u et h a ts e t s
qj (pzero)=0 .36 This value is
pzero =
α(β − γ)+γNpnm
(β + γ (N − 1))
.

























(β−γ) ((N + E − M)po +( M − 1)pm)
#
.( 2 5 )
Note that (21) is equivalent to
(N + E − M)qo + Mqm − Nqnm − Eqj (pzero) > 0
36Note that this implies that Ottaviano and Thisse’s (1999) demand system satisﬁes the principles under-
pinning WARP.
37since qj (pzero)=0 . After substituting for qo, qm and qnm using (24), (25) and qi (pnm)
respectively, this inequality becomes
(β − γ)[Npnm + Epzero − (N + E − M)po − Mpm] > 0.
Given that β>γ , this condition means that total quantity increases after the merger if
Npnm + Epzero > (N + E − M)po + Mpm.( 2 6 )
Step 3: To see that this inequality always holds in a long run equilibrium, consider the











(β−γ) ((N + E − M − 1)po + Mpm)
#
.( 2 7 )
We know from the long run equilibrium condition that po <p nm. This implies that e qi (pi) is
tangent to the average cost curve of a typical outsider at a lower price and higher quantity
than the price and quantity at which b qi (pi) is tangent to the average cost curve. Since the









Moreover, we can see from (23) and (27) that qi (pi) and e qi (pi) have the same slope. Hence,
since qi (pi) is parallel to e qi (pi) and intersects b qi (pi) at pnm,i tm u s tb et h a tqi (pi) has a
higher intercept (on both axes) than e qi (pi). qi (pi) − e qi (pi) > 0 implies that
(N − 1)pnm + Epzero > (N + E − M − 1)po + Mpm.
Since, as noted above, po <p nm,w ec a na d dpo to the right hand side of this equality and
pnm to the left hand side, and still preserve the inequality. We get
Npnm + Epzero > (N + E − M)po + Mpm,
which is the same condition as (26).
38